Agentic operations

An AI operator with the same tool surface you have, with full audit and instantly revocable scope.

Connect any MCP-compatible client (Claude Code, Cursor, Codex) to the ApeX teamserver. The teamserver exposes 25+ structured tools across 15 scopes. Scoped tokens let a client-reviewed AI run read-only while you keep full autonomy for yourself. Every tool call is logged with arguments, agent id, result, and duration. The log is immutable. Sessions revoke in a single click.

The tool surface

CategoryRepresentative capabilities
Querylist/get agents, tasks, listeners, modules, payloads, audit log
Executerun commands, Lua modules, .NET assemblies, aggressor commands on any agent
Manageupload modules, create payloads, create/start/stop listeners, manage vault files
Documentationembedded reference docs (Lua API, command reference, BOF conventions, profile format, aggressor SDK)

A full engagement, one instruction

apex-console // engagement APP-OWA1
operator> start on APP-OWA1, map lateral paths to a DC without
          mimikatz-style apis. stage findings, write a brief.

agent>    reading Lua api references
          done.

agent>    drafting module recon_v1.lua
          scope: hostname, domain, token privileges, open shares,
          named-pipe surfaces, routing table
          mode: non-destructive

agent>    upload_lua_module(APP-OWA1, recon_v1)
          ok, module id 2b19...9f03

agent>    execute_lua_module(APP-OWA1, recon_v1)
          domain: corp.local
          dc candidates: DC01 (10.1.0.4), DC02 (10.1.0.5)
          current context: svc_backup (service account)
          SeImpersonatePrivilege: enabled

agent>    drafting module lateral_plan_v1.lua
          scope: enumerate reachable services on DC01, probe
          for named-pipe impersonation via spoolsv
          mode: non-destructive, timeout 20s

agent>    upload_lua_module(APP-OWA1, lateral_plan_v1)
          ok, module id 7f42...a1c6

agent>    execute_lua_module(APP-OWA1, lateral_plan_v1)
          DC01 \pipe\spoolss reachable from APP-OWA1
          path identified: service-account impersonation via
          spoolsv on DC01

agent>    staging apex-vault/engagement-7xq2/brief.md
          brief written. 3 findings, 1 recommended path.
          dwelling for review in agent console.

The same console, with or without an AI

ApeX is operator first. The agents list, task queue, module catalog, and command palette are the same whether a human types the next step or an MCP-connected AI stages one for review. The console is the shared surface. The audit log does not care which hand pressed enter.

ApeX agents view with an operator running recon-sweep and a Rubeus triage task against a selected agent, with the agents list on the left and the task console on the right

Modules the agent can reach for

Aggressor packages, Lua modules, and .NET assemblies are versioned and lifecycle managed in the teamserver. The AI operator lists, uploads, and runs from the same catalog you use. Havoc API compatibility means existing aggressor packages port with minimal changes.

ApeX Modules page showing the Aggressor packages tab with a SituationalAwareness.zip package registering 44 commands including adcs_enum, arp, cacls, and domainenum

Scoped tokens

Give a client-reviewed AI read-only access. Give yourself full autonomy. Tokens are per-user, scoped to exact tool categories, and revocable in one click.

Immutable audit

Every tool call is logged with arguments, agent id, result, and duration. The log is append-only. Not editable, not forgeable, exportable for client reports.

Human in the loop

AI stages the plan. You approve destructive actions in the agent console. Approval posture is set per engagement; strict review for client work, open loop for lab testing.

Grounded answers, not hallucinations

The LLM reads the Lua API, command reference, BOF conventions, profile format, and aggressor SDK from inside MCP. When it drafts a module, it quotes real function signatures. When it asks about a profile field, it reads the schema. Documentation is a first-class tool category, not a prompt-stuffing hack.